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Abstract 
Our understanding of the defense mechanisms against cyber-attacks is, to a great extent, based on 
preparation and deterrence. There is limited understanding, and in particular, limited evidence on how 
cyber security responders act to contain and recover from a cyber-attack. The actions of responders, 
including IT experts, corporate communications staff, and selected managers are critical. To address this 
gap, this research proposes applying the concept of sense-making, which has been extensively used to 
analyze human crisis behaviors. In this emerging research, we conduct an investigation into a cyber-
attack case to shed light on the contextual and collective activities taken by responders in coping with 
cyber-attack response. We expect the results to validate or challenge theorizations of cyber security 
training and competencies from the communication and collaboration perspective. In a practical sense, 
our research can stimulate organizations to reflect on their own cyber security preparedness from the 
human perspective. 
Keywords 
Cyber-attacks, cyber security, IT management, responders, sense-making 
Introduction 
Cyber-attacks constitute a spectrum of threats with increasingly significant impacts to companies and 
public entities – concordant with the increasing reliance that organizations place on computerized 
information systems. Cyber-attacks are constantly evolving, and the public as well as law enforcement is 
playing a game of catch-up in trying to anticipate threats and cope with new scenarios that arise. While 
many researchers have focused on technical preparations for cyber-attacks, some researchers have 
addressed organizational preparations using the concepts of information (systems) security (Finne 1998, 
Mishra & Dhillon 2006), cyber security (Von Solms & Van Niekerk 2013), and cyber defense (Denning 
2013). Owing to the difficulty to obtain reliable data on cyber-attacks from CERTs (Choucri et al. 2014) or 
the victim organizations themselves, much of the empirical research on cyber security has been done on 
insider threats, and user security compliance (e.g. Straub 1990, Siponen 2000), rather than e.g. 
investigating responder (McLaughlin et al. 2017) behaviors. Thus, our understanding of organizational 
cyber security capabilities tends to be theoretical (Kolini & Janczewski 2015). Our current research 
addresses this gap. 
Sense-making, a concept introduced by Weick (1995), has been widely applied to understand human 
behavior in crisis situations. In addition to Weick’s own work, it has been used, for example, to 
understand the context of hurricanes (Mills & Weatherbee 2006), industrial accidents (Gephart 1997, 
Mills & O’Connell 2003), and embezzlement scandals (Strandberg & Vigso 2016). In these analyses, 
sense-making has been found to be useful in teasing out the hidden reasons of why certain actions were 
selected by the participants which eventually led to crucial outcomes for the crisis response, influenced 
the media narrative, or had a major contribution to how society came to see the crisis event. The 
advantage of the sense-making concept is its focus on situated, contextual analysis of events involving 
organizational members, in which they selectively extract cues from the environment and form “plausible 
meanings” for the emerging situation. This process of forming plausible meanings is always dependent on 
the background and experiences of the involved members. This type of analysis holds great potential for 
application also in cyber-attack cases, because cyber-attacks are one form of crisis. 
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In this emerging research, our objective is to understand responder behaviors in cyber security. To that 
end, we apply the case study method to investigate a specific cyber-attack situation, and analyze the 
behaviors of key actors in this case using the sense-making lens. 
Do we know anything about cyber security responders? 
Criminological theories have featured strongly in cyber security research. Deterrence theory (Straub 1990, 
Workman & Gathegi 2007, Herath & Rao 2009a, 2009b, D’Arcy & Herath 2011), situational crime 
prevention (Willison & Siponen 2009, Martini and Choo 2014), and neutralization theory (Siponen & 
Vance 2010) have all been applied to understand why cybercrimes are committed, and what measures can 
be taken to reduce the number of cybercrimes. This literature mainly contributes recommendations 
regarding the content of organizational security policies, and although the development of such policies is 
definitely one major function of any cyber security taskforce, this research stream does not really address 
how responders practice cyber security in organizations and IT departments. 
Different factors have been identified that link to cyber security. Fundamentally, top management should 
be involved (Kankanhalli et al. 2003). Adequate funding is also crucial (Bandyopadhyay & Sebalia 2008, 
Hua & Bapna 2011), as is education and training for staff (Straub & Welke 1998). However, IT users are 
not the only group that need training. There have been attempts to define “curricula” for responders, of 
which one is the National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework, drafted by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security. This curriculum outlines a number of competency areas that IT security personnel 
should master (Martini and Choo 2014). Others note the importance of practical experience, such as 
gained in cyber security competitions and scenario-based exercises. These methods are suggested as 
contributing to the skills of information security personnel (White & Goles 2004, Luse & Triplett 2009, 
Martini & Choo 2014). 
Kolini and Janczewski (2015) propose a cyber security model for organizations that is based on their 
classification of cyber-attacks. The model acknowledges the existence of detective and preventive 
capabilities, but also response and recovery capabilities, which are necessary in the event of a cyber-attack 
actually occurring despite the existing protective measures. They recognize the existence of both active 
and passive defensive measures and the possibility of collaboration among different actors in cyber 
security, thereby covering a large variety of different cyber-attack scenarios. 
Empirical work on cyber security has been conducted using cross-sectional surveys to IT managers and 
employees (Straub 1990, Kankanhalli et al. 2003, Herath & Rao 2009a, 2009b, Siponen & Vance 2010), 
surveys constrained to a single company (Workman & Gathegi 2007), experiments with students (Martini 
& Choo 2014), and case studies (Straub & Welke 1998, Luse & Triplett 2009). However, even if responder 
groups, such as IT security workers, were included in the sample in some of the studies, cyber-attack 
behaviours were not the focus of the study. 
The above suggests that research on cyber security thus far mostly addresses technical and managerial 
planning that takes place before the threat materializes. There is less research on what actions should be 
taken by responders. In particular, there are extremely few empirical studies of organizations targeted by 
cyber-attacks. Empirical studies would be valuable, because they could shed light on what organizations 
are actually doing to improve their cyber security, and how responders actually behave during cyber-
attacks. 
Sensemaking and its processes, and applications in IT research 
Weick (1995) introduces “sense-making” as a process by which social actors assign meanings to events. 
The inherent ambiguity in situations forces people to make assumptions, apply cause-effect relationships, 
and infer possible outcomes, which are then translated into a set of meanings regarding the current 
situation. Based on this set of meanings, people conduct actions, leading to changes in the situation and 
guides further meaning regarding the situation. Sense-making is defined as both the activity of assigning 
meanings as well as its outcome, the new organization that emerges as a result of actions taken based on 
the assigned meanings. He proposes seven interrelated properties for sense-making. Hereafter, these 
properties are explained and some applications of sense-making in the IT field are reviewed. 
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Processes of sense-making 
Sense-making is an (1) ongoing, constant process which is, however, punctuated by events of different 
character; varying ambiguity, urgency, and importance. Therefore, while the process itself is continuous, 
individuals can isolate events from one another, and create meaning for each event particularly. Sense-
making aims at the creation of meanings that are (2) plausible rather than accurate to specific groups. The 
creation of these plausible meanings is based on (3) extracted cues. People do not consider situations 
holistically, but depend on a limited number of cues in building their interpretations of the world. The 
selection of such cues, in turn, depends on the persons’ background, experiences, and other factors. 
Therefore, (4) identity construction is one crucial factor in cue selection. Who you think you are affects 
how you make judgements regarding your circumstances. Another is (5) social factors, referring to the 
property that sense-making draws on norms, values, rules, culture, and communication. People are not 
isolated from the collective when making sense of events, but are influenced by social phenomena. Sense-
making is also influenced by (6) retrospection, relation to past events. When confronted with a new 
situation, people tend to reflect this situation to what they have experienced before. They compare the 
new event with specific past experiences and draw on these experiences to make judgements on the 
nature of the new event. In this way, the (7) environment is enacting, or producing new meaning and 
organization through its influence in sense-making. This enaction also refers to the new environment that 
is the outcome of the actions based on constructed meaning. 
Sense-making in IT research involving crises 
There are two main approaches that sense-making has been applied in IT research involving crises. One is 
the examination of IT artifacts in crisis sense-making. IT artifacts, such as Incident Control Systems, 
artificial intelligence, and semantic web, have been proposed to support sense-making in emergencies and 
disasters (Potter et al. 2007, Foulquier & Caron 2010, McMaster et al. 2012). On the other hand, sense-
making has been used as a heuristic tool for IT artifact design and evaluation (Muhren & Van De Walle 
2009, Bergstrand 2011). The second major field of application is the examination of human crisis actions. 
In relation to this, Landgren (2004, 2005) and Duffy et al. (2013) address information sharing and shared 
use of IT in emergency situations. Landgren (2005) points out that first responder shared use of IT can be 
in conflict with traditional role-based emergency management information systems. Duffy et al. (2013) 
propose that non-hierarchical teams are more efficient at sharing relevant factoids compared to 
hierarchical teams, which influences the outcome of sense-making. 
Research method and design 
Due to the large variety of possible cyber-attacks (Kjaerland 2005), defensive measures must address 
several kinds of threats. It is this complexity which requires that our research method should be able to 
capture rich data in the subject organization. This, together with the lack of prior research in the area, 
motivated us to select the case research method. The case method is appropriate for understanding a 
complex situation in its context, particularly when theory in the area is in its formative stages (Benbasat et 
al. 1987, Eisenhardt 1989, Yin 2009). Due to the resistance of organizations to inquiry regarding cyber-
attacks, the aim is to investigate a single “revelatory case” (Yin 2009). 
An appropriate case has already been identified and permissions negotiated. Data collection is to focus on 
the investigation of the specific cyber-attack situation and the events leading up to the discovery of this 
cyber-attack. Data will be collected by interviews with persons who were involved in key roles in the 
cyber-attack investigation after it was discovered: the IT manager in charge of the cyber-attack 
investigation, the IT experts, the Chief Information Officer, and the corporate communications people. 
The interviews will be semi-structured, and recorded on tape. Afterward, the tapes will be transcribed to 
text. 
A comprehensive analysis will be conducted on the transcripts using the processes of sense-making as 
outlined above. The analysis proceeds by identifying sections and passages of the transcripts that address 
staff behavior and actions. Labels (Strauss & Corbin 1990) are assigned to these sections and passages 
using the processes of sense-making. Then, the labelled sections and passages are arranged by the actor 
involved. This makes it possible to identify the actor that is most closely linked to the specific sense-
making processes, and the behaviors of these different actors will be seen in relation to each other in a 
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collaborative, organizational task. The conclusions are made based on the resulting document and media 
reports that had been published on the cyber-attack. 
Expected results 
Similar to prior sense-making research in other crisis topics, we expect the analysis to illustrate previously 
unknown cyber-attack responder behaviors that are particularly related to communication and 
collaboration in the organization. We also expect it to be a start to empirically verify the relevancy of 
proposed cyber security education/training, scenario-based exercises, and competencies, particularly in 
the areas of organizational communication and collaboration. 
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